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Aligning the Belt and Road 
Initiative with Myanmar’s 
Sustainable Development Plan: 
Opportunities and Challenges*
Zhou Taidong1
Abstract The ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by the Chinese 
government provides an important opportunity to promote the global 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This 
article, using Myanmar as a country case study as it is strongly committed to 
both the BRI and the 2030 Agenda, aims to paint a nuanced picture of how 
the BRI could benefit Myanmar’s sustainable development. After providing 
an overview of Myanmar’s recent development context, the Myanmar 
Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP), and the progress of China–Myanmar 
cooperation under the BRI, it argues that there are both big opportunities 
and huge challenges in tapping the potential of the BRI’s development 
dividends for Myanmar. The article proposes that China and Myanmar should 
make joint efforts in terms of mainstreaming conflict-sensitive approaches, 
increasing the confidence of Myanmar’s public in Chinese investment, 
encouraging responsible investment, and diversifying financing options.
Keywords: 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; Belt and Road 
Initiative; Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan; China–Myanmar 
Economic Corridor; Myanmar.
1 Introduction
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), formerly known as One Belt, One 
Road (OBOR) proposed by China’s president, Xi Jinping, and then 
arduously advocated and pushed forward by the Chinese government, 
offers an important opportunity to accelerate efforts to achieve the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) globally. Though different in 
scope, the BRI and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(2030 Agenda) share overlapping goals and objectives with big potential 
to drive mutual synergy (BRF Advisory Council 2019). The five 
pillars of  the BRI – policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, 
unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bond 
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– are intrinsically linked to the 17 SDGs (Guterres 2019). By closing 
financing gaps and providing new sources of  economic growth through 
improved connectivity, the BRI could help reduce poverty and improve 
a range of  social needs including employment, education, and health.
Myanmar, the largest country in mainland Southeast Asia with a 
population of  53 million and located strategically at the junction of  
Southeast Asia and South Asia, has witnessed rapid growth in recent 
years and become one of  the world’s fastest growing economies 
(IMF 2016). In August 2018, the Myanmar government formulated 
the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) to ensure 
coherence among different policies and institutions, reinvigorate 
reform, and promote action to achieve the SDGs. In the meantime, 
the new government, led by the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, has embraced 
the BRI and economic cooperation with China despite some setbacks 
during Myanmar’s post-2011 reforms. While the BRI presents huge 
opportunities for Myanmar to fulfil its MSDP and development 
ambitions as well as the 2030 Agenda, challenges remain.
This article aims to analyse the opportunities and challenges brought 
by the BRI to the implementation of  the MSDP in the context of  
a globally unanimous 2030 Agenda. It is structured in five parts. 
Following this introduction, Section 2 briefly outlines Myanmar’s recent 
development context and the MSDP. Section 3 provides an overview 
and progress of  China–Myanmar cooperation under the BRI based 
on the five pillars. Section 4 discusses opportunities and challenges in 
synergising the BRI and the MSDP and, more importantly, in tapping 
the potential of  the BRI to contribute to Myanmar’s sustainable 
development. Section 5 concludes and puts forward recommendations 
to align the BRI and the MSDP to optimise its use as an investment tool 
for maximum sustainable development dividends.
2 Myanmar’s development context and the MSDP
Myanmar, isolated for much of  the past six decades, is undergoing 
a critical process of  political, economic, and social transition. Since 
opening up in 2012, the country has experienced rapid growth. Though 
the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowed down from 
6.8 per cent in fiscal year (FY) 2017 (1 April 2017–31 March 2018) to 
6.2 per cent in the transitional FY2018 (see Figure 1) according to the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), the growth is still robust by regional 
and global standards (ADB 2019). To promote economic recovery in 
a turbulent global context, the Myanmar government has undertaken 
a series of  policies in recent years including opening up to foreign 
direct investment (FDI) of  retail and wholesale trade and the insurance 
business; implementation of  the Companies Act; and large investments 
in infrastructure projects including those related to the BRI. As a result, 
growth is forecast at 6.6 per cent in FY2019 and 6.8 per cent in FY2020 
(ADB 2019).
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Nevertheless, the country is still facing tremendous development 
challenges. Subnational conflicts are still widespread, affecting up to one 
quarter of  the population, and impeding the entire country’s political 
trajectory, economic growth, and human development (Burke et al. 
2017). The military still plays a massive role in economic governance 
and senior military officers own shares in some of  the most profitable 
extractive businesses (Stokke, Vakulchuk and Øverland 2018). While 
FDI flows increased in 2017/18 compared to the previous fiscal year, 
FDI commitments declined by 14 per cent in 2017/18 compared to 
2016/17, reflecting uncertainty in the investment climate related to the 
Rakhine crisis and weak reform momentum (World Bank 2018).
Major sources of  investment largely rely on Singapore, China, and 
Thailand, and are limited in diversification. Myanmar’s ranking in the 
2019 World Bank Doing Business report remained unchanged at 171st 
out of  185 countries, despite some key improvements in reducing the 
cost of  registering a company and increasing the reliability of  electricity 
supply, and the transparency of  tariff information (World Bank 2018). 
The country also ranks the lowest in the Southeast Asia region in other 
assessments; 148 out of  the 189 countries and territories in the Human 
Development Index (HDI) (UNDP 2018) and 131 out of  the 140 
economies in competitiveness according to the World Economic Forum 
(Schwab 2015).
Persistent low-quality infrastructure remains a major impediment to the 
country’s economic growth and competitiveness (Verbiest and Naing 
2017). Myanmar is one of  the most underdeveloped countries in Asia 
in terms of  infrastructure. Only 38.9 per cent of  the road network is 
paved and only 37 per cent of  the population has access to electricity. 
The country has the lowest road density and greatest power-sector 
Figure 1 Myanmar annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate (2008–18)
Source Author’s own, based on data from the Myanmar Statistical Information Service 
(2019).
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investment needs in the region (Vakulchuk et al. 2017). According to 
the ADB (2014), investment gaps in Myanmar could total as much as 
US$80bn by 2030 or US$4.7bn per year.
In August 2018, the Myanmar government issued the MSDP as the 
single national strategy (2018–30) to provide an overarching plan for 
longer-term sustainable development and strengthen coordination and 
coherence among the myriad sectoral, ministerial, and subnational 
plans. The 66-page-long document not only builds upon multiple 
existing strategy documents and sectoral plans, but also mediates 
between local developmental needs and the global sustainable 
development agenda. It sets out three pillars, five goals, 28 strategies, 
and 251 action plans (see Box 1). The three pillars include peace and 
stability (pillar 1), prosperity and partnership (pillar 2), and people and 
planet (pillar 3), which are the same as the five Ps that broadly capture 
the scope of  the 2030 Agenda.
For each of  the five goals, the MSDP has developed clear strategies and 
multidimensional action plans, to be supported by multiple programmes 
and projects, and a broad range of  stakeholders. Key strategies consist 
of, among others, fostering union-wide peace, promoting equitable 
and conflict-sensitive socioeconomic development, improving rule of  
law and good governance, strengthening civil engagement and public 
participation, enhancing macroeconomic management, supporting job 
creation, creating a secure and conducive investment, as well as building 
a priority infrastructure base (Myanmar Union MOPF 2018). Priority 
sectors include trade, financial services, infrastructure, education 
Box 1 Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) (2018–30)
Pillar 1: Peace and stability
Goal 1: Peace, national reconciliation, security, and good 
governance
Goal 2: Economic stability and strengthened macroeconomic 
management
Pillar 2: Prosperity and partnership
Goal 3: Job creation and private sector-led growth
Pillar 3: People and planet
Goal 4: Human resources and social development for a 
twenty-first century society
Goal 5: National resources and the environment for national 
prosperity
Source Myanmar Union MOPF (2018: 5).
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and health, environment, sustainable energy, natural resources, and 
sustainable cities. Though goals and action plans in the MSDP are 
country-specific, relevant SDG targets were identified to ensure 
consistency and alignment between the MSDP and the SDGs.
The Myanmar Union Ministry of  Planning and Finance (MOPF) is 
the focal entity for the implementation of  the MSDP and houses the 
MSDP Implementation Unit (MSDP-IU). The MSDP-IU, consisting 
of  the National Economic Coordination Committee (NECC), the 
Development Assistance Coordination Unit (DACU), and the Planning 
Department, and Policy Appraisal and Progress Reporting Department 
of  the MOPF, is responsible for providing guidance, approving strategic 
decisions, and resolving strategic issues regarding the implementation 
of  the MSDP. With help from the World Bank and other agencies, the 
MOPF also established a project bank to facilitate implementation 
of  the MSDP in a predictable, coordinated, and transparent manner. 
The project bank is a rolling databank consisting of  major and 
transformative projects that have been screened, appraised, and 
prioritised, and that are ready for implementation with the most 
appropriate source of  financing.
Projects included in the database will not only go through the screening 
process which is based on their relevance with strategic planning and 
prioritisation, but also the categorisation process in terms of  source 
of  financing, such as public–private partnership (PPP) projects, 
development assistance projects, and government budget projects. 
Projects will then be dealt with in different ways. For example, budgets 
will be transferred to projects that should be funded by the government; 
development assistance projects are transferred to the DACU and some 
of  the PPP projects will be transferred to the PPP Centre (Aung 2019). 
As of  the end of  June 2019, the project bank has yet to be formerly 
launched and no detailed information at project level has been revealed.
It is worth noting that the MSDP greatly emphasises environmental 
sustainability, including tackling deforestation, mangrove loss, the 
illegal wildlife trade, unregulated mineral extraction, air and water 
pollution, increases in waste, and climate change. It makes clear that 
environmental and social impact studies for all the proposed projects 
must comply with regulations made by the Myanmar Ministry 
of  Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation, and the 
government will be responsible for compensating and resettling those 
who are impacted. The MSDP reflects that the Myanmar government is 
trying to ensure balance between development in economic, social, and 
environmental dimensions. This will have important implications for 
BRI cooperation, to be illustrated in Section 4.
3 China–Myanmar cooperation under the BRI: current status
Despite government change and some setbacks during Myanmar’s 
post-2011 reform, China’s economic engagement with Myanmar 
has deepened. Myanmar is also involved in two of  the six economic 
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corridors identified under the BRI.2 This section outlines the progress 
of  China–Myanmar BRI cooperation in terms of  the five pillars – 
policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, 
financial integration, and people-to-people bond.
3.1 Policy coordination
Improving policy coordination is an important guarantee for 
implementing the BRI. The major indicators include: the building 
of  an intergovernmental macro policy exchange and communication 
mechanism, the number of  visits by leaders from both sides, and mutual 
political trust and alignment in development strategies and policies 
(China National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry 
of  Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of  Commerce 2015). Since 2013, 
when the BRI was proposed, China and Myanmar have made great 
achievements in terms of  policy coordination, reflected by the frequency 
of  visits by Myanmar leaders to China, their positive comments on the 
BRI, as well as progress in BRI cooperation. For example, in November 
2014, Myanmar President U Thein Sein pointed out at the Dialogue of  
Strengthening Connectivity Partnership in Beijing that the BRI would 
bring peace, stability, and prosperity to the world. He then further 
remarked that the Myanmar side would deepen cooperation with China 
in infrastructure connectivity in September 2015 (China News 2015).
State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi also paid her first international 
visit to China after winning the election, and was present in the first 
and second Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum in 2017 
and 2019 respectively. The Memorandum of  Understanding (MoU) on 
the BRI signed between the two countries in May 2017 represented a 
milestone for policy coordination between the two sides (Ying 2018).
Cooperation between the two countries under the BRI made another 
great stride when Chinese State Counsellor and Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi proposed the establishment of  the China–Myanmar Economic 
Corridor (CMEC) during his meeting with his counterpart Aung 
San Suu Kyi in November 2017. The CMEC, taking the shape of  
a ‘reverse-Y’, will connect China’s southwestern province of  Yunnan to 
Mandalay in Central Myanmar, and then east to Yangon and West to 
Kyaukpyu, Rakhine State. The CMEC is the second bilateral economic 
corridor after the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and 
constitutes an important part of  the BRI. It aims to promote economic 
integration by linking three important economic centres in Myanmar; 
namely, Mandalay, Yangon New City, and the Kyaukpyu Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) (Ying 2018).
In February 2018, the two sides finalised a 15-point MoU at the 
working group level and agreed to collaborate on many sectors 
including basic infrastructure, construction, manufacturing, agriculture, 
transport, finance, human resource development, telecommunications, 
and research and technology in order to develop the CMEC. Following 
that, the two governments formally signed the MoU to build the CMEC 
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in September 2018 (Thiha 2019). During the second BRI Summit at the 
end of  April 2019, China and Myanmar reached further agreements on 
trade, economic development, and technical assistance.
Myanmar’s positive gesture was further reflected in the establishment 
of  the OBOR Implementation Steering Committee in November 
2018, which is chaired by the State Counsellor and includes chief  
ministers from subnational governments as well as representatives 
from various departments. The functions of  the Steering Committee 
include improving coordination among different organisations, giving 
policy-related guidance, formulating management plans, and organising 
experts to conduct research on BRI-related projects. The Myanmar 
government also formed the CMEC Joint Committee chaired by the 
Union Minister for the MOPF and the CMEC Committee chaired 
by the Union Minister for Commerce in late 2018. Such committees 
not only signal the importance Myanmar attaches to the BRI, but also 
demonstrate that the CMEC is an important part of  the comprehensive 
strategic cooperation between China and Myanmar. That said, the 
Myanmar government has emphasised that the chosen projects under 
the CMEC must align with the country’s national priorities as outlined 
in the MSDP. It has been reported that only nine of  the 30 projects 
proposed by China were approved by the Myanmar side (Lwin 2019).
3.2 Infrastructure connectivity
Infrastructure connectivity is a priority area for implementing the 
initiative, covering transport, port infrastructure, oil and gas pipelines, 
the power grid, civil aviation cooperation, as well as cables and 
other communication networks (China National Development and 
Reform Commission, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of  
Commerce 2015). The projects along the CMEC are largely related 
to infrastructure construction, including the China–Myanmar oil and 
gas pipelines, the Kyaukpyu deep-sea port with two berths in its initial 
phase, the Kunming–Kyaukpyu railway line, the Mandalay–Tigyaing–
Muse expressway, and the Kyaukpyu–Nay Pyi Taw highway projects.
Among them, the China–Myanmar oil and gas pipelines, the first oil 
and gas pipelines running through the south to the north of  Myanmar, 
predate the BRI and are in operation. The crude oil pipeline is jointly 
invested in by the Southeast Asia Pipeline Company Ltd (50.9 per cent), 
a subsidiary company of  the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), and the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) (49.1 per 
cent). The gas pipeline is jointly invested in by the CNPC Southeast 
Asia Pipeline Company Ltd (50.9 per cent), the MOGE (7.37 per cent), 
the POSCO DAEWOO Corporation (25.04 per cent), the ONGC 
CASPIAN E&P B.V. (8.35 per cent), the Gas Authority of  India 
Ltd (4.17 per cent), and the Korea Gas Corporation (4.17 per cent), 
bringing together six parties from four countries (CNPC 2017).
The China–Myanmar oil and gas pipeline project, through supplying 
energy to China, has not only diversified the oil and gas imports and 
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exports of  Myanmar and spurred growth in the oil and gas industry, 
but also played an important role in providing energy to central and 
northern Myanmar through the different offtake points. For example, 
in Kyaukpyu, due to the project, residents now enjoy 24-hour access 
to electricity at a cheaper cost. The project also contributes substantial 
economic benefits to Myanmar including tax revenue, investment 
dividends, right-of-way fees, cross-border fees, training funds, and others.
Progress has also been made in the Kyaukpyu deep-sea port project. 
China and Myanmar signed a framework agreement on 8 November 
2018, three years after the bid was awarded to the China-based CITIC 
Group. The framework now foresees a US$1.3bn joint investment 
for implementation of  the first phase of  the Kyaukpyu deep-sea port. 
The total cost of  the project, which is now planned in four phases, is 
estimated at about US$7bn. The first phase will include two deep-water 
berths. The China-based CITIC Group will hold 70 per cent stake 
while the remaining 30 per cent will be invested by the Myanmar 
government and local public firms.
The two countries also signed an MoU in October 2018 for preparation 
of  a feasibility study for the Muse–Mandalay railway line. In June 2019, 
the China Railway Eryuan Engineering Company (CREEC) submitted 
a technical report as part of  the feasibility study. The report is based on 
a ground survey along the Muse–Mandalay highway road and includes 
soil analysis results as well as suggested routes. Officials of  the CREEC 
and Myanmar Railways conducted inspections on the ground and also 
held public meetings with the authorities, residents, and elders of  the 
townships of  Kyaukme, Lashio, and Muse, where the railway might 
pass through. The railway is expected to span over 430km with five 
train stations. The designed speed for the train is 160km per hour.
Figure 2 Trade value between China and Myanmar (US$ million)
Source Author’s own, based on data from the Myanmar Statistical Information Service 
(2019).
50,000
45,000
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
Trade with China
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Total foreign trade
IDS Bulletin Vol. 50 No. 4 December 2019 ‘The Belt and Road Initiative and the SDGs: Towards Equitable, Sustainable Development’ 69–88 | 77
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
3.3 Unimpeded trade
Investment and trade cooperation are a major task in building the 
BRI, including investment and trade facilitation, the reduction and 
removal of  investment and trade barriers, and the optimisation of  
trade structure. During the BRI period 2013–17, Myanmar’s trade 
with China (excluding Hong Kong and Macau) steadily increased 
(see Figure 2) and by 2017, the total trade between the two countries 
exceeded US$11.79bn, an average increase of  13.8 per cent over the 
five years (Myanmar Statistical Information Service 2019). China has 
remained Myanmar’s largest trading partner two years in a row. The 
outward direct investment from China (excluding Hong Kong and 
Macau) in Myanmar, once affected by the suspension of  the Mystone 
Dam project, recovered back to US$12.9bn in 2017 (see Figure 3), with 
344 projects in sectors such as oil and gas, electricity, manufacturing, 
transport, and communications far exceeding those from other major 
countries in the region (ibid.). The investment is likely to further 
increase when the projects planned under the CMEC are implemented, 
including the New Yangon City project (US$1.5bn),3 the Kyaukpyu 
SEZ (US$2bn), the Mandalay Yida Economic and Trade Cooperation 
Zone (US$4bn), and the Myanmar–China border economic 
cooperation zones.
3.4 Financial integration
Financial cooperation is an important element of  implementing the BRI. 
Myanmar is one of  the founding members of  the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB). In 2016, the AIIB, together with the World 
Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the ADB approved 
its first loan for a Myanmar project: a US$20m loan to the 225MW 
(megawatt) Myingyan gas-fired power plant (Frontier Myanmar 2016). 
Myanmar is also one of  the 28 countries that had approved the Guiding 
Figure 3 China’s foreign direct investment in Myanmar in comparison (US$ million)
Source Author’s own, based on data from the Myanmar Statistical Information Service (2019).
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Principles on Financing the Development of  the BRI, which includes 
fostering a transparent, friendly, non-discriminatory, and predicator 
financing environment, underscoring the importance of  conducting 
social and environmental impact assessments and risk management, 
as well as sustainable and inclusive development (China Ministry of  
Finance 2017). China and Myanmar cooperated in a bilateral currency 
swap and settlement. The China and Myanmar Currency Exchange 
Center was established in Ruili City, Yunnan Province in 2015, making 
Ruili the first city to trade kyat in China. The centre intended to build an 
effective platform to promote the Sino–Myanmar currency exchange’s 
standardisation and legalisation, increase China–Myanmar trade, and 
facilitate cross-investment (Yurun and Yingqing 2015).
3.5 People-to-people bond
The people-to-people bond provides public support for implementing 
the BRI reflecting in, among others, education, training, tourism, public 
diplomacy, as well as corporate social responsibility. In 2017, the Chinese 
government awarded 103 Myanmar student scholarships and arranged 
more than 168 short-term training projects with 637 trainees (Ying 
2018). China and Myanmar have also agreed to establish cultural centres 
in the two countries, with the launching of  the China Cultural Center 
in Yangon in 2017. Cooperation and exchanges among thinktanks 
have witnessed a huge increase in the two countries since 2013 (ibid.). 
In addition, China has increased and reoriented its aid to people’s 
livelihood projects in Myanmar, including offering humanitarian aid to 
help displaced people in Rakhine State, performing eye operations for 
Myanmar patients, and implementing a series of  agricultural technology 
transfer projects under the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation Mechanism. 
One of  China’s civil society organisations, the China Foundation for 
Poverty Alleviation, also established its first overseas country office in 
Yangon, providing scholarships for Myanmar students.
4 Discussion
The MSDP has more or less internalised the 2030 Agenda based on 
Myanmar’s context. As Myanmar’s largest neighbour, trading partner, 
major investor, and development partner, China could definitely play an 
important role in fostering sustainable development in Myanmar. The 
BRI, more specifically the CMEC, can be an overarching framework for 
the two sides to upgrade cooperation for shared benefits. Nevertheless, 
there are still daunting challenges ahead to translate such ideas and 
policies into actions.
4.1 Opportunities
The CMEC, as part of  the BRI, represents big opportunities for 
Myanmar to implement its MSDP and the 2030 Agenda in different 
ways. First, the CMEC shares synergies with the MSDP in design 
and represents the convergence of  common interests between the two 
countries. For example, the MSDP considered adequately addressing 
the infrastructure gap and upgrading international transport corridors 
as the key to achieving Myanmar’s development ambitions. In fact, one 
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could argue that the idea of  the CMEC comes from Myanmar’s own 
development plan. The Industrial Policy formulated by Myanmar’s 
Ministry of  Industry in 2016, which later constitutes an important part 
of  the MSDP, identified four economic corridors for global integration, 
including the North–South Economic Corridor, the East–West 
Economic Corridor, the Northeast–Southwest Economic Corridor, and 
the economic corridor from Yangon to Myawaddy. The CMEC greatly 
overlaps two of  them; namely, the North–South Economic Corridor 
(Yangon to Mandalay) and the Northeast–Southwest Economic 
Corridor (Kyaukpyu–Mandalay–Muse).
The Industry Policy also made it clear that Myanmar would construct 
international deep-sea ports and place industries close to them, including 
Kyaukpyu deep-sea port where ‘cargo ships from Europe, Africa and 
West-Asia may dock’ (Myanmar Union MOI 2016: 17). The Kyaukpyu 
SEZ was also long planned as a commercial centre of  port cities to 
help address the economic imbalances between developed Yangon and 
underdeveloped Rakhine State. Thus, it could be said that the CMEC 
fully aligns with the MSDP or even originates from Myanmar’s own 
development plans, catering to Myanmar’s development needs.
Second, the CMEC could be a catalyst for infrastructure development 
and economic growth in Myanmar. A modern and well-functioning 
infrastructure is fundamental to Myanmar to develop into a developed 
market economy. There have been many assessments globally regarding 
the positive impacts of  infrastructure on economic growth, including 
enhancing competitiveness and productivity, improving accessibility of  
public services, facilitating trade and mobility, as well as generating jobs 
(McKinsey and Company 2016; Straub and Terada-Hagiwara 2010). 
Evidence from other countries also suggests that BRI road projects and 
associated investments offer considerable opportunities in increased 
productivity, reduction of  trade costs and barriers, agglomeration 
effects, and flow on effects for production, employment, and incomes 
(Berg et al. 2015).
Road and railway construction under the CMEC would connect major 
urban centres and communities across the country and with major cities 
and markets in neighbouring countries, notably Bangladesh, China, and 
India. For example, with Muse being the largest trade portal between the 
two nations and Mandalay being central Myanmar’s commercial centre, 
the Muse–Mandalay railway line has the potential to play an important 
role in enhancing connectivity between Myanmar and China as well as 
with other regions of  Southeast Asia. Port development could also enable 
Myanmar to become a regional hub, thanks to its strategic location. 
As such, the CMEC could offer Myanmar an important opportunity 
to modernise and industrialise, especially the underdeveloped western 
regions. Improved infrastructure connectivity, delivered to a high quality 
with a focus on viability, resilience, and sustainability would catalyse the 
development of  new industrial chains, value chains, and supply chains, 
nurture human capital, and support long-term growth.
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Thirdly, the BRI could also provide an impetus to address the 
significant financing gap in Myanmar. Given the limited public 
budget, the Myanmar government would need to explore different 
funding mechanisms, including the PPP model, loans from multilateral 
development banks, as well as aid from development partners. The 
different funding mechanisms and channels under the BRI, such as the 
Silk Road Fund, the China Development Bank, the Import and Export 
Bank, Chinese commercial banks, and state-owned enterprises, could 
partially satisfy funding needs.
Meanwhile, the CMEC would also have huge implications for 
the Myanmar peace process as its projects extend across many of  
Myanmar’s conflict areas and affect the livelihoods of  local people. The 
CMEC provides impetus for China to contribute to the peace process 
in Myanmar. To secure the success of  the economic corridor, China will 
need to work with the Myanmar government to address subnational 
conflicts in Northern and Western Myanmar. In fact, the Chinese 
authorities have brokered informal talks to end immediate hostilities 
and pressured ethnic armed organisations to participate in formal peace 
dialogues (International Crisis Group 2017). Arguably, the CMEC could 
complement the Myanmar government’s efforts in promoting peace and 
stability through development.
4.2 Challenges
While there is strong political will and passion from the Myanmar 
government for the BRI, few projects have been implemented and there 
are daunting obstacles ahead to put the CMEC on the ground.
Firstly, the CMEC currently lacks concrete and effective tools to address 
the security risks led by the domestic crisis in Myanmar. Subnational 
conflict in Myanmar is not a peripheral issue and the reasons are 
extremely complex, driven by competing demands concerning control 
over resources, authority, and territory (Burke et al. 2017). Conflicts 
between the Myanmar government and ethnic armed groups not only 
jeopardised border security and regional connectivity but also brought 
security risks to Chinese investors in Myanmar. The Rohingya issue in 
Rakhine and ethnic armed rebels in northern Myanmar constitute the 
major hurdles for the CMEC. For example, Kyaukpyu is located in the 
restive Rakhine State, and although the Kyaukpyu deep-sea port and SEZ 
are not in the Rohingya conflict zone, the potential threat that Rohingya 
militants pose to the Kyaukpyu infrastructure cannot be easily dismissed. 
Highways and railways under the CMEC will also pass through other 
conflict zones. In addition, conflicts in northern Myanmar have resulted 
in the occasional closure of  some border posts and the deaths and injuries 
of  Chinese civilians. While there might be strong concerns about debt 
sustainability on the Myanmar side, it is threats to the security of  Chinese 
works and Chinese-built infrastructure projects that worry the Chinese 
side most and could potentially hamper cooperation. The non-intervention 
foreign policy principle further constrains China’s policy options in 
dealing with such complex issues at Myanmar’s subnational level.
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Secondly, while the CMEC receives a widespread positive attitude from 
government officials and business communities, Myanmar’s public seem 
to have little knowledge of  the CMEC and remain suspicious of  China’s 
investment. The CMEC faces challenges in both information and 
trust deficit. China’s growing footprints in Myanmar aroused popular 
resentment and social unrest in the past and such memories have not 
withered away. With the adoption of  opening up policy in Myanmar, its 
civil society groups are becoming more active and vocal as well as more 
cautious towards China’s investment.
However, the author’s field visits revealed that a large proportion of  
civil society and the public rely on social media regarding CMEC 
information. Very few thinktanks are doing research and exchanges 
on the CMEC or even China’s cooperation with Myanmar due to a 
shortage of  funding and expertise. In the meantime, the Myanmar 
public also has territorial concerns regarding further integration with 
China. For example, in early 2019, a piece of  news regarding a Chinese 
company’s establishment of  the Yongbang Digital Economic Zone in 
Mongla, Shan State, which will encourage use of  digital currency, has 
provoked wide complaints on the violation of  the country’s sovereignty 
(Wansai 2019).
Thirdly, as many of  the CMEC projects are large infrastructure 
projects, they will face huge challenges in terms of  land acquisition and 
compensation, environmental protection, and stakeholder engagement 
in Myanmar. The SDGs and the MSDP both recognise that Myanmar’s 
development depends fundamentally on sustainable management of  
the natural environment. Studies have shown that Myanmar’s natural 
environment functions greatly as a capital asset, providing goods and 
services to the country’s citizens (Mandle et al. 2016; Emerton and 
Aung 2013). As such, the Myanmar government has repeatedly made 
it clear that there would be no exception to the rigorous and stringent 
assessment process of  identifying and reviewing projects under the 
CMEC, taken from their strategic alignment with the MSDP.
Though the MSDP sets out that the Myanmar government will be 
responsible for land acquisition and resettlement, history has shown that 
the issue is more complex on the ground. Land disputes often emerge 
for different reasons, including unclear or overlapping ownership, the 
theft of  compensation funds by corrupt local governments, or concerns 
about losing livelihoods resulting from loss of  land. The China–
Myanmar oil and gas pipelines project, completed in 2015, still has 
disputes regarding land compensation.
According to a report from the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
in Myanmar (Helsingen et al. 2017), the BRI road infrastructure, 
if  not properly planned or constructed, could have many negative 
impacts including increased risks of  natural disasters such as landslides 
and flooding, water pollution, wildlife mortality, and ecosystem 
degradation. The significance of  these risks is underscored by the fact 
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that the CMEC cuts through areas that are home to about 24 million 
people and they could be impacted by increased sedimentation due to 
upstream infrastructure development, deforestation, and other land use 
change (ibid.).
Underlining all of  the challenges regarding land acquisition, 
environmental protection, and community engagement are a lack 
of  proper systems, institutions, instruments, and capacities on both 
sides to monitor, assess, and make changes accordingly during 
project implementation. For example, despite improving its domestic 
environmental policies, China still does not promulgate regulations 
concerning environmental protection of  its foreign direct investment. 
Guidelines for foreign investment and the promotion of  corporate social 
responsibility largely rely on the initiative of  the investing company. 
Environmental criteria and their impacts in decision-making are still 
unclear for major Chinese funders such as the Import and Export Bank 
and the China Development Bank.
Another important issue lies in how to deal with the relationship among 
different interest groups and how to establish a broader community 
of  common interests. Rapid changes that accompany accelerated 
development generate both winners and losers and can create instability. 
Field studies also revealed that local residents would only support 
development initiatives if  they experience direct benefits. Community 
members often supported improvements to local roads which ease direct 
access to markets, schools, and hospitals. However, some have expressed 
concerns that new and large roads would enable more military 
engagement, attract armed disputes over taxation, land confiscation, 
or forced displacement, as well as flows of  migrants from other regions 
(Burke et al. 2017: 34).
Fourthly, there are also financial sustainability concerns on the 
Myanmar side. The railway and highways across the northern 
mountain ranges could be very expensive. An earlier feasibility study for 
the railway priced the project at US$20bn, and China had offered to 
pay for 90 per cent. However, even then, Myanmar could not afford its 
share. China and Myanmar also face several other financial challenges. 
Myanmar’s financial system fails to meet international standards. 
The country’s stock market is still underdeveloped, and it is hard for 
enterprises to obtain financing in Myanmar. In addition, as a currency 
swap agreement has yet to be signed between China and Myanmar, it is 
inconvenient for Chinese enterprises to invest in Myanmar.
5 Conclusion and recommendations
The Myanmar NLD government has adopted various policies to 
reinvigorate and maintain its economic growth, including issuing 
the MSDP and embracing the BRI. In essence, the MSDP and the 
BRI are fully aligned and the BRI could be an important vehicle for 
Myanmar to realise its development ambitions and achieve the SDGs. 
This is probably why China–Myanmar BRI cooperation has steadily 
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progressed, unanticipated by many observers. Nevertheless, to fully tap 
the potential of  the BRI’s contribution to the MSDP, both countries still 
face huge challenges in security, social, environmental, and financial 
dimensions, and will need to make strong efforts to bring the initiative to 
the ground.
First and foremost, China and Myanmar should mainstream conflict-
sensitive approaches into all aspects of  CMEC implementation. 
A sustained peace is integral to both the CMEC and Myanmar’s 
sustainable development. The MSDP attributes domestic conflicts to 
‘mistrust between groups, the lack of  transparent and accountable public 
institutions, the exclusion and marginalisation of  people from decision-
making processes as well as a persuasive sense of  injustice generated by 
inequitable distribution of  resources, acute macroeconomic instability 
and vulnerability to economic shocks’ (Myanmar Union MOPF 2018: 8).
As such, while continuing to provide necessary assistance to the Union 
Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong, China should work with 
Myanmar partners to make sure programmes and projects under the 
CMEC are designed, implemented, and managed with the participation 
of  all stakeholders. Great efforts should be made in terms of  disclosing 
information and decentralising management of  development activities, 
especially when the CMEC passes through many of  the conflict-affected 
areas. While the CMEC could strengthen social, economic, and physical 
connectivity between lagging regions such as Kyaukpyu with growth 
hubs such as Mandalay and Yangon, special attention should be paid 
to improve benefits at the subnational level, including fiscal income and 
job opportunities. China could also prioritise flows of  its development 
assistance into the areas along the economic corridor.
Secondly, more efforts will be needed to increase the public’s confidence 
in the CMEC in Myanmar. Detailed information regarding MoUs and 
agreements signed by both governments should be disclosed in a timely 
manner. Bidding for and the tendering of  CMEC projects should be 
open to local, regional, and global actors. Joint research and dialogues 
with and among thank tanks and civil society groups should be 
encouraged. With the support of  joint governments, 1.5-track or 2-track 
mechanisms could be established. Both sides could also enhance the 
multilateral dimension of  the CMEC to improve credibility, including 
working together with different multilateral and bilateral parties such as 
the World Bank, the ADB, Japan, Thailand, and Singapore.
Thirdly, responsible investment, including active engagement with 
community and civil society organisations should be encouraged. After 
a series of  high-profile controversies such as the Myitsone Dam and the 
Letpadaung copper mine project, Chinese companies need to attend 
to local people’s concerns over environmental and social impacts to 
restore the Myanmar public’s trust in Chinese investments. Both sides 
should encourage community-based development initiatives and adopt 
consultative methods such as establishing village committees and giving 
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residents a say in deciding and monitoring the spending of  funds. 
Environmental and social impact assessments should be made available 
to the public in a manner that is accessible to all sectors of  society, 
encouraging diverse participation and collaboration.
Both governments should also consider taking mandatory measures to 
enhance environmental accountability in pushing forward the CMEC. 
Chinese parties should put into use the sustainability criteria stipulated 
in the Guidance on the Building of  the Green Belt and Road released by China’s 
Ministry of  Environmental Protection (2017), and refer to global 
sustainability standards for infrastructure development in Myanmar. 
Thorough infrastructure planning should be encouraged to avoid 
critical areas, including areas important for biodiversity and providing 
ecosystem services. The participation of  Myanmar civil society at all 
levels and stages of  project planning should be facilitated to avoid 
negative social and environmental impacts. Patience, transparency, and 
public participation in the decision-making process are the key to ensure 
success for the BRI and the CMEC.
Fourthly, given the fiscal constraints faced by the Myanmar government, 
both sides should make efforts to diversify its financing options, 
including the promotion of  the PPP model and better design and use 
of  China’s grants. In principle, infrastructure projects that are deemed 
commercially viable and bankable should be pursued through PPP 
and other innovative financing models. Given the relatively quick 
development of  PPP in China, China can strengthen its knowledge-
sharing with Myanmar in improving PPP mechanisms, including those 
relating to procurement and other relevant areas. China and Myanmar 
can also agree to strategically make use of  China’s grants to support the 
advancement of  the CMEC, including supporting feasibility studies, 
carrying out environmental and social assessment, improving vocational 
education and providing livelihood projects for people to be affected 
by different projects. In addition, the Chinese Ministry of  Finance has 
issued a Debt Sustainability Framework for Participating Countries of  
the Belt and Road Initiative (China Ministry of  Finance 2019).4 China 
and Myanmar could jointly conduct debt sustainability analysis (DSA) 
to provide references for lending decisions and manage debt risks.
During the second BRI Summit, China has placed high quality at the 
centre of  the BRI agenda and commits the BRI to peace, prosperity, 
inclusiveness, openness, innovation, greenness, and cleanness. Perhaps 
no country more than Myanmar would welcome the BRI if  these 
commitments are translated into actions.
Notes
*  This IDS Bulletin is supported by the Center for International 
Knowledge on Development’s (CIKD) China–UK Partnership 
Programme on Knowledge for Development.
1 Zhou Taidong, Director, Global Development Research Division, 
Center for International Knowledge on Development (CIKD), 
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Development Research Center of  the State Council (DRC) and PhD 
candidate at the China Agricultural University, China.
2 Namely, the New Eurasian Land Bridge, the China–Mongolia–
Russia Economic Corridor, the China–Central Asia–West Asia 
Economic Corridor, the China–Mainland Southeast Asia Economic 
Corridor, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the 
Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor.
3 The New Yangon City Project is a commercial project but part of  the 
CMEC plan. A framework agreement was signed between the New 
Yangon Development Company and the China Communications 
Construction Company (CCCC), which envisions a complex of  new 
towns, industrial parks, and urban development projects.
4 The Debt Sustainability Framework for Participating Countries of  
the BRI was issued by the Chinese Ministry of  Finance in April 
2019. It is a non-mandatory policy tool which sets out procedures of  
debt sustainability analysis, including debt coverage, macroeconomic 
projections, realism tools, country classification, and debt-carrying 
capacity, stress tests, risk signals, the use of  judgement, the final risk 
ratings, and the DSA write-up.
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